Critical Severity
Published: Oct 30, 2026

[GitHub] tp-link-archer-axe300-command-injection-rce

Rce
Type
N/A
CVSS Score
1
Views
Anonymous
Author

Description

Root RCE via authenticated OS command injection in the TP-Link Archer AXE300 ISP Speed Test (spdt_server -> sys.fork_call). Firmware 1.0.11. CWE-78, CVSS 8.5.

# TP-Link Archer AXE300 — authenticated command injection (root RCE) in the ISP Speed Test

![TP-Link Archer AXE300 — authenticated command injection leading to root RCE](assets/social-preview.png)

[![CVSS](https://img.shields.io/badge/CVSS-8.5%20High-critical?style=flat-square)](#scoring)
[![CWE](https://img.shields.io/badge/CWE--78-00599?style=flat-square)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
[![Firmware](https://img.shields.io/badge/firmware-1.0.11%20Build%2020241115-informational?style=flat-square)](#am-i-affected)
[![Platform](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-Broadcom%20BCM4908%20%2F%20OpenWrt-informational?style=flat-square)](#platform-notes)
[![Vendor advisory](https://img.shields.io/badge/vendor%20advisory-FAQ%204935-orange?style=flat-square)](https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/4935/)
[![Disclosed](https://img.shields.io/badge/disclosed-2026--10--24-blue?style=flat-square)](#summary)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSE)

**`spdt_server` is concatenated into a shell command string and executed as `root` on the router.**

A remote attacker holding the Archer AXE300's admin web UI credential can send a single HTTP
request to the router's own JSON API and run arbitrary shell commands as root — full compromise
of the device and, because the router is the network gateway, of everything behind it. The
flaw is CWE-78 (OS command injection) in the vendor's LuCI model layer, present in the
**latest shipping firmware, 1.0.11 Build 20241115**, on a model that is **not** covered by
TP-Link's own command-injection advisory.

> **Disclosure status.**
> Published publicly in this repository on **2026-10-24**, before the vendor was notified. The finding was then reported to TP-Link's Product Security Team at [email protected] on **2026-10-26**. As of this update, TP-Link has published no fix, advisory, or CVE for this model or code path. The advisory summary is also filed as a pinned issue:
> [#1 — Au

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