# RCE CVE (≧9.0) scanner
## cve-scanner
Fingerprint-driven blind testing CVE scanner: first identify Web/service fingerprints, hit components only run CVE/vulnerability exp mapped to that component, fall back to full blind testing when unable to identify application fingerprints. Automatically detects targets and verifies real command execution (RCE).
**All targets use real Docker images, no mocks.**
---
## Fingerprint-Driven Process
```
target ──► fingerprint.Detect()
│
├─ Hit application fingerprint (WebLogic/Tomcat/Struts2/Spring/Shiro/ActiveMQ/...)
│ └─► Only execute CVE exp mapped to that component (+ generic information disclosure detection)
│
├─ Hit only weak Web service fingerprint (nginx/Apache/PHP/Node.js)
│ └─► Treated as unidentified, execute full exp blind testing
│
└─ No fingerprint matched
└─► Full exp blind testing
```
### Secondary Fingerprint Extension During Collection
All exp requests go through the same collector (`internal/capture`):
1. First round `fingerprint.Detect()` (`bb` is `QuickDetect`) gets baseline fingerprint;
2. Each exp/detection response is re-fingerprinted (`fingerprint.ObserveResponse`);
3. When new components appear outside baseline (e.g., WebLogic/Struts2/Shiro/Tomcat exposed in subsequent exp responses but not detected on first access), immediately merge into fingerprint and continue executing exp mapped to that component; executed detections are deduplicated by `ran` set;
4. Both `bb` and `scan` follow this process; `scan` collection results are also the payload source for smuggling replay.
### Smuggling Replay After Zero Success (Second Pass)
When `bb` completes normal scanning with **0 findings** and `scan` globally has **0 PASS (no real command echo)**, automatically enter second pass:
1. Collector has recorded each exp request actually sent this round (method/path/headers/body) and direct response;
2. For each target, first confirm CL.TE/TE.CL channel with limited TE obfuscation combinations;
3. Replay all collected payloads once through channel by request (deduplicated, no longer limited by count);
4. Smuggling response shows RCE features not in direct response → `CRITICAL`; only confirms channel and successful delivery → `HIGH`;
5. Smuggling response also goes through fingerprint identification: if new component exposed, rerun exp mapped to that component.
Supports http/https; automatically skips if no payloads for replay (e.g., only ran GET detection). `scan` mode integrated with same collector, smuggling replay results written to result file as `CVE=SMUGGLING-REPLAY`.
Built-in fingerprint library references webanalyze/Wappalyzer matching methods (response headers, Server, Set-Cookie, title, body features + WebLogic Console/Tomcat Manager/Actuator/Nacos/Metabase/GeoServer/OFBiz/Solr deep detection), pure standard library implementation, no third-party dependencies. Component → CVE mapping see [internal/fingerprint/cve_map.go](internal/fingerprint/cve_map.go).
View fingerprints separately:
```bash
./cve-scanner fp -t http://127.0.0.1:7001
./cve-scanner fp -t http://127.0.0.1:8161 -json
```
---
## Supported Vulnerabilities
| CVE | Component | Protocol | CVSS | Affected Versions | Port | id | whoami | hostname | pwd |
|-----|-----------|----------|------|-------------------|------|-----|--------|----------|-----|
| [CVE-2026-70748](docs/CVE-2026-70748.md) | Oracle WebLogic Server | T3/IIOP | 9.8 | 12.2.1.4, 14.1.1.0 | 7