RCE CVE (≧9.0) scanner
# cve-scanner
Fingerprint-driven blind CVE scanner: first identify Web/service fingerprints, only run CVE/vulnerability exp mapped to hit components, fall back to full blind testing when application fingerprints are not identified. Automatically detect targets and verify real command execution (RCE).
**All ranges use real Docker images, no mock.**
---
## Fingerprint-driven workflow
```
target ──► fingerprint.Detect()
│
├─ Hit application fingerprint (WebLogic/Tomcat/Struts2/Spring/Shiro/ActiveMQ/...)
│ └─► Only execute CVE exp mapped to that component (+ generic leak detection)
│
├─ Only hit weak Web service fingerprint (nginx/Apache/PHP/Node.js)
│ └─► Treat as unrecognized, execute full exp blind testing
│
└─ No fingerprint matched
└─► Full exp blind testing
```
### Secondary fingerprint expansion during collection
All exp requests go through the same collector (`internal/capture`):
1. First round `fingerprint.Detect()` (`bb` as `QuickDetect`) gets baseline fingerprint;
2. Each exp/detection response is re-fingerprinted (`fingerprint.ObserveResponse`);
3. When new components outside baseline appear (e.g., WebLogic/Struts2/Shiro/Tomcat not recognized at first access but exposed in subsequent exp responses), immediately merge into fingerprint and continue executing exp mapped to that component; already executed detections are deduplicated by `ran` set;
4. Both `bb` and `scan` follow this workflow; `scan` collection results are also the payload source for smuggling replay.
### Smuggling replay after zero success (second pass)
When `bb` normal scan completes with **0 findings** and `scan` globally **0 PASS (no real command echo)**, automatically enter second pass:
1. Collector has recorded each exp request actually sent this round (method/path/headers/body) and direct connection response;
2. For each target, first confirm CL.TE/TE.CL channel using limited TE obfuscation combinations;
3. Replay all collected payloads through the channel one by one (deduplicate by request, no longer limit count);
4. Smuggling response shows RCE features not in direct connection response → `CRITICAL`; only confirm channel and successful delivery → `HIGH`;
5. Smuggling response is also fingerprint identified: if new components are exposed, re-run exp mapped to that component.
Supports http/https; if no payloads can be replayed (e.g., only ran GET probes) automatically skip. `scan` mode has integrated the same collector, smuggling replay results written to result file as `CVE=SMUGGLING-REPLAY`.
Built-in fingerprint library references webanalyze/Wappalyzer matching methods (response headers, Server, Set-Cookie, title, body signatures + WebLogic Console/Tomcat Manager/Actuator/Nacos/Metabase/GeoServer/OFBiz/Solr deep detection), pure standard library implementation, no third-party dependencies. Component → CVE mapping see [internal/fingerprint/cve_map.go](internal/fingerprint/cve_map.go).
View fingerprints separately:
```bash
./cve-scanner fp -t http://127.0.0.1:7001
./cve-scanner fp -t http://127.0.0.1:8161 -json
```
---
## Supported vulnerabilities
| CVE | Component | Protocol | CVSS | Affected versions | Port | id | whoami | hostname | pwd |
|-----|-----------|----------|------|-------------------|------|-----|--------|----------|-----|
| [CVE-2026-70748](docs/CVE-2026-70748.md) | Oracle WebLogic Server | T3/IIOP | 9.8 | 12.2.1.4, 14.1.1.0 | 7