Low Severity CVE-2026-110486
Published: Nov 22, 2026

[GitHub] CVE-2026-110486

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N/A
CVSS Score
8
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Description

Mosquitto 2.1-2.1.2: net__read_ws returns 4 for a zero-length WebSocket data frame without writing payload, so the MQTT parser reads uninitialised heap bytes in CONNECT before auth. ASan differential of real broker 2.1.2 vs vendor-fixed 2.1.3: phantom 'First packet not CONNECT (00)' on vuln, clean on fixed.

# CVE-2026-110486 — Eclipse Mosquitto: empty WebSocket data frame desynchronises the MQTT parser before authentication

[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
[![Research status: validated](https://img.shields.io/badge/research-validated%20differential-success.svg)](#5-expected-results)

| | |
| --- | --- |
| **CVE** | CVE-2026-110486 |
| **Component** | Eclipse Mosquitto — `lib/net_ws.c::net__read_ws()`, builtin websockets implementation |
| **Affected** | 2.1 through 2.1.2 |
| **Fixed in** | **2.1.3** — genuine vendor fix, commit `021b063d` |
| **CWE** | CWE-125 (Out-of-bounds Read), CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write) |
| **Impact** | An unauthenticated WebSocket client can make the broker parse bytes that were never read from the wire: uninitialised heap contents enter CONNECT handling, enabling information disclosure and, with the right heap layout, `to_process` underflow and an out-of-bounds write before authentication |
| **Vector** | Network — a WebSocket connection to a `protocol websockets` listener, one zero-length data frame |
| **Trigger** | a masked WebSocket data frame with payload length 0 |

For a zero-length data frame, `net__read_ws()` consumed the four masking-key
bytes, set `len` to 4, and never wrote to the caller's buffer:

```c
// v2.1.2, lib/net_ws.c (~L302, ~L344)
len = net__read(mosq, buf, count); // skipped when payloadlen == 0
...
if (mosq->wsd.pos == (ssize_t)mosq->wsd.payloadlen) { // 0 == 0
/* data frames have no out_packet, so none of the branches reset len */
}
return len; // 4 — but buf is untouched
```

`packet__read_single()` treats that return value as four bytes of MQTT
data. The vendor fix (2.1.3) introduces a separate `mqtt_len`, initialised
to -1, and returns -1/EAGAIN for an empty frame after reading the mask.

The laboratory builds both upstream tags with ASan+UBSan and drives the
real broker over its WebSocket listener. During the handshake the broker
ze

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